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Abstract 
A brief examination of various criminal jurisprudences in the world reveals that nationality is taken as one of the 
main bases for extending the judicial jurisdiction of states. In such cases, the jurisdictional bases for prosecution are 
in turn the personal and the passive personality principles. Yet, despite their widespread acceptance, regulating 
these two jurisdictional bases has not proven to be an easy task, if only for the encroachments that a wholesale resort 
to the jurisdictional bases in question may make into the sovereignty of other states. In this regard, the Iranian 
experience marks out many of the difficulties that law-makers around the world may face, when purporting to 
legislate on the bases for exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction. Another reason for viewing the Iranian encounter 
with the personal and the passive personality principles as a case of special interest is the mode in which the Iranian 
legislature has sought to adjust the application of the jurisdictional bases in question against the requirements of 
sharia law. By taking these factors into consideration, this essay will map out the successes and failures of the 
Iranian legislature in conceiving these two jurisdictional bases in the 2013 Code. 
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I. Introduction 
A brief examination of various criminal jurisprudences in the world reveals that nationality is 
taken as one of the main bases for extending the judicial jurisdiction of states. In principle, the 
criminal laws of states cannot be applied to a criminal act committed outside their territory. 
However, a state can reserve for itself the right to assert jurisdiction over a criminal case if its 
nationals happen to be either the perpetrator of an offence committed abroad or its victims.1 In 
such cases, the jurisdictional bases for prosecution are in turn the personal and the passive 
personality principles. Yet, despite their widespread acceptance, regulating these two 
jurisdictional bases has not proven to be an easy task. Two issues are at stake here. On one 
hand, states have sought to recognize the personal and the passive personality principles in 
their penal codes so as to not tighten their freedom, when they are required to exercise 
jurisdiction either for keeping their public order or protecting their nationals. On the other 
hand, it remains true that exercising jurisdiction on the basis of either the personal or the 
passive personal principle is an exception to the main base of jurisdiction, that is, the territorial 
principle.2 Therefore, drawing precise boundaries for the jurisdictional bases in question 
becomes a paramount task for law-makers and judges around the world. 
The experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) in regulating the personal and 
the passive personality principles is very intriguing. Of these two jurisdictional bases, the 
personal principle used to be considered as the only acceptable ground for prosecuting crimes 
committed outside Iran. However, the exercise of the personal principle in Iran has undergone 
some radical transformations in recent years. For example, in the Amended General Penal 
Code of 1973 (hereinafter the 1973 Code), some primary preconditions had been set out for the 
application of the personal principle. Yet, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, except for the 
presence of the accused in Iran, the preconditions for the exercise of the personal principle 
were entirely lifted in the course of the three penal bills of 1982, and the Islamic Penal Code of 
1991 (hereinafter the 1991 Code).3 In the most recent penal legislation passed by the Iranian 
Parliament in 2013, another precondition that had been removed in the previous criminal 
legislations was redeemed to govern the exercise of the personal principle. This was the 
prohibition of double jeopardy (infra).   
Another development in the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 (hereinafter the 2013 Code)4 is that the 
passive personality principle has for the first time found a place in the Iranian criminal laws. 
As will be seen later in this essay, there is a broad spectrum of opinions as to the utility of this 
 
1  As will be seen later, however, the Anglo-American legal systems have taken a much more nuanced position towards 
these jurisdictional bases, and do not tend to employ them save for the cases of exceptional nature. HALLEVY GABRIEL, A 
Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law, London 2010, at 124.  
2  See generally STRAUSS ANDREW L., Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, Harvard International Law Journal 1995, Vol. 36, at 373.  
3  An unofficial English translation of the 1991 Code is available at http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-
documents/iranian-codes/3200-islamic-penal-code-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-book-one-and-book-two.htm, last accessed 
28 December 2015. 
4  An unofficial English translation of the 2013 Code is available at http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-
documents/iranian-codes/1000000455-english-translation-of-books-1-and-2-of-the-new-islamic-penal-code.htm, last accessed 
28 December 2015. 
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jurisdictional base.5 However, it is important that the exercise of the passive personality 
principle shall not be done in an unbridled manner, if only for the encroachments that it may 
make into the sovereignty of other states. Rather, the application of the passive personality 
principle must be accompanied by some important constraints. It is this dimension of the 
passive personality principle that renders its regulation particularly difficult.  
In this regard, the Iranian experience marks out many of the difficulties that law-makers 
around the world may face, when purporting to legislate on the bases for exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Another reason for viewing the Iranian encounter with the personal and 
the passive personality principles as a case of special interest is the mode in which the Iranian 
legislature has sought to adjust the application of the jurisdictional bases in question against 
the requirements of sharia law. By taking these factors into consideration and by invoking the 
conception of the personal and the passive personality principles in the criminal codes of some 
other states, this essay will map out the successes and failures of the Iranian legislature in 
conceiving these two jurisdictional bases in the 2013 Code. At the end, it will be concluded that 
notwithstanding following some progressive milestones, the Iranian legislature is yet to draw 
precise boundaries for the application of the personal and the passive personality principles, 
and thus, the conception of these two jurisdictional bases in the 2013 Code is yet to meet the 
modern standards of penal legislation. 
II. Definition and Classification of Crimes in the Iranian 
Penal System 
Before we take on the issues of jurisdiction in the Iranian penal system, it is necessary for us to 
provide a brief introduction to the definitions and classification of offences in the Iranian legal 
system. The importance of this introduction can better be grasped when one considers that the 
classification of offences in the Iranian penal system on some occasions runs hand-in-hand 
with the application of the personal and the passive personality principles. This is a by-product 
of the important role that sharia plays in conceptualizing different types of offences in the 
Iranian penal system. In the Islamic law tradition, crimes are generally classified on the basis of 
the punishments prescribed for them.6 In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
legislations on criminal law in Iran have consistently followed this pattern for the classification 
of offences.7 Therefore, the offences enumerated in the 2013 Code have been classified in the 
following order: 
1. Crimes punishable by hadd (hodood) 
Article 15 of the 2013 Code has provided a definition for the concept of hadd: “[h]add is a 
punishment for which the grounds for, type, amount and conditions of execution are specified 
in holy Sharia”. The hadd crimes are usually considered the most serious religious offences in 
 
5  For an international law view of the passive personality principle, see RYNGAERT CEDRIC, Jurisdiction in International Law, 
Oxford 2015, at 110.   
6  TELLENBACH SILVIA, Iran, in: HELLER KEVIN/DUBBER MARKUS D. (Eds.), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, 
Stanford 2011, 320-351, at 321.   
7  RAHAMI MOHSEN, Development of Criminal Punishment in the Iranian Post-Revolutionary Penal Code’, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2005, Vol. 13, 585-602, at 588–589. 
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the Islamic criminal justice doctrine.8 As is evident from the text of Article 15, hadd crimes are 
enumerated in the Islamic sacred texts (regarding which and whose authority, there are some 
differences between schools of thought in Islam).  
Hadd crimes are largely specified in Book II of the Islamic Penal Code. Such crimes as unlawful 
sexual intercourse (Article 221), sodomy (Article 233), false accusation of unlawful sexual 
intercourse against someone else (Article 245), pandering (Article 242), swearing at the prophet 
(Article 262), consumption of intoxicants (Article 264), theft (Article 267) and corruption on 
earth (Article 286) are among the most severe hadd crimes. Apart from the crimes specified in 
the 2013 Code, the Iranian legislature in Article 220 has left the door open for judges to refer to 
the Islamic books on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) to identify other hadd crimes that may have 
escaped criminalization in the 2013 Code. Needless to say, given the vital importance of the 
principle of legality in the sphere of criminal law, this is not an acceptable mode of criminal 
legislation. However, this must be blamed on Article 167 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, which states:  
“The judge is bound to endeavor to judge each case on the basis of the codified 
law. In case of the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgment on 
the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatawa. He, on the 
pretext of the silence of or deficiency of law in the matter, or its brevity or 
contradictory nature, cannot refrain from admitting and examining cases and 
delivering his judgment.”9  
Many different interpretations of this Article have been produced by the legal scholarship in 
Iran, whose consideration goes beyond the limited space of this essay.10 However, in short, it 
must be said that such provisions as Article 220 cannot but be viewed as incompatible with the 
principle of legality, and as such, signify an area in which the Iranian legislature has fallen 
short of creating a balance between sharia instructions and the modern imperatives of criminal 
law. 
2. Crimes punishable by qisas 
The definition of qisas as provided in Article 16 of the 2013 Code is as follows: “[q]isas is the 
main punishment for intentional bodily crimes against life, limbs, and abilities which shall be 
applied in accordance with Book One of this law”. Therefore, the punishment of qisas is 
rendered when at issue is the infliction of an intentional bodily injury. When it comes to crimes 
punishable by qisas, two types of crime must be distinguished: crimes punishable by qisas of 
limb, and those punishable by qisas of life. As regards the latter, the only crime punishable by 
qisas of life is murder; this literally means the death penalty, whilst ‘qisas of limb’ refers to the 
retributive infliction of bodily harm on the body of a convict who has committed a crime 
punishable by qisas of limb. 
 
8  PETERS RUDOLPH, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First 
Century, Cambridge 2005, at 53.  
9  An official English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is available at 
http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html, last accessed 28 December 2015.   
10  For a summary of these debates, see TELLENBACH SILVIA, Islamic Criminal Law, in: DUBBER MARKUS D./HÖRNLE TATJANA, 
The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford 2014, 248-268, at 264.  
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3. Crimes punishable by diya (diyat) 
The same crimes susceptible to punishment by qisas can become liable to diyat if done in an 
unintentional manner. In Article 17, diyat is defined as follows: “[d]iya, whether fixed or 
unfixed, is monetary amount under holy Sharia which is determined by law and shall be paid 
for unintentional bodily crimes against life, limbs and abilities or for intentional crimes when 
for whatever reason qisas is not applicable”. 
4. Crimes punishable by ta’zir (ta’zirat) 
Generally, any crime not subsumed within the rubric of one of the categories mentioned above 
must be categorized as a ta’zirat crime (or a crime punishable by ta’zirat). As discerned above, 
crimes that come under the ambit of hadd, qisas and diyat are very limited in number, and 
normally signify wrongdoings specified in the sacred religious texts. Article 18 of the 2013 
Code defines ta’zirat as: 
“a punishment which does not fall under the categories of hadd, qisas, or diyat 
and is determined by law for commission of prohibited acts under Sharia or 
violation of state rules. The type, amount, conditions of execution as well as 
mitigation, suspension, cancellation and other relevant rules of ta’zir crimes 
shall be determined by law.” 
Therefore, criminalization of acts punishable by ta’zirat has less to do with the instructions of 
the holy sources than with the requirements of public order. As a result, this group of crimes 
can be said to have been created at the discretion of authorities. That said, to raise the 
satisfaction of the Assembly of Guardians tasked with approving legislations passed by the 
Iranian legislature on the basis of their compatibility with sharia law, the authors of the Islamic 
Penal Code made a distinction between two types of ta’zirat: ta’zirat prescribed by sharia law, 
and ta’zirat not prescribed by sharia law. The former consists of a very limited number of acts 
admonished and stigmatized in sharia law, such as sexual intercourse with one’s spouse 
during the fasting hours of Ramadan, for which there is no fixed punishment in sharia law.11 
Due to their insignificance and impractical nature, we shall not elaborate on ta’zirat prescribed 
by sharia law. Having provided a brief introduction to the categorization of offences in the 
2013 Code, it is time to embark on the main focus of this essay, and analyse the way in which 
the personal and the passive personality principles are conceived in the Iranian penal system. 
III. The Personal Principle: Definition and Limitations 
In the context of criminal law, the personal principle can be defined as extending the judicial 
jurisdiction of states vis-à-vis crimes committed outside their sovereign territory by nationals 
(active nationality principle).12 Articles 6 and 7 of the 2013 Code have accepted this basic 
definition, and have specified that subject to some limitations, discussed later in this essay, an 
Iranian national charged with committing a crime abroad can be prosecuted and punished in 
 
11  The Advisory Opinion of the General Legal Bureau of the Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 45, 28/05/92 available only in 
Persian.   
12  RYNGAERT, supra n. 5, at 102.  
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Iran. Not all states take nationality as the only basis for proceeding with the personal principle. 
Some states such as Finland, Denmark, Island, Liberia, Norway and Sweden go as far as 
subjecting their residents to the personal principle, too.13  
According to Iranian laws, in order for the personal principle to apply, an offender must hold 
Iranian nationality at the time of committing a crime. Therefore, acquiring or abandoning 
Iranian nationality in the aftermath of committing a crime would not influence the application 
of the personal principle.14 This is while the penal laws of some states have seen no problem in 
establishing jurisdiction over their nationals for crimes committed by them before their 
naturalization or even after removal of their nationality.15 Article 113-6 of the French Penal 
Code takes a rather similar approach and stipulates that the personal principle applies “even if 
the offender has acquired French nationality after the commission of the offence of which he is 
accused”.16 Section 2 of Article 7 of the German Criminal Code is also very similar to its French 
counterpart.17  
The personal principle is meant to fill the gaps that might otherwise have emerged from an 
exclusive reliance on the territorial principle. As a result, the application of the personal 
principle must be adjusted against the backdrop of the territorial principle, and the way this is 
achieved, is left to the subjective discretion of each state. Accordingly, some states have 
reserved a broader periphery of preconditions for applying the personal principle, and some 
have given more freedom to prosecutors and judges to prosecute and try an accused on the 
basis of the personal principle. All in all, it must be borne in mind that when it comes to the 
exercise of the personal principle in different jurisdictions, there is no uniform rule engraved in 
stone. Nonetheless, we briefly mention some of the general rules that, especially in states 
following the civil law tradition, are more often than not taken to govern the exercise of the 
personal principle. 
1. Seriousness of Crimes 
There has been a continuous debate among legal scholars as to whether or not the application 
of the personal principle must be confined to serious crimes. It has been said that applying the 
personal principle to non-serious crimes will only lead to the time and resources of the 
prosecuting state being wasted.18 This is particularly true when one takes note of the fact that 
such necessities as the collection of evidence are much more costly in cases concerning the 
personal principle. It is thus that in some states such as the UK, the application of the personal 
 
13  MALANCZUK PETER, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, London 1997, at 111.  
14  KHALEGHI ALI, Tahavolāt Qanūn Jadid Jazāy Islāmi Dar Mvured Qalamrū Makāni Qavānin Jazāyi (in Persian), [English: 
The Developments of the New Penal Code vis-à-vis the Territorial Scope of Criminal Laws], Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology Studies 2012, Vol. 1, 8-38, at 12. For the Romanization of Persian and Arabic words the authors used the Library 
of Congress transcription scheme. 
15  FAZEL MUHAMMAD, Almabādi Al'āmeh fi Tashri' Aljazāyi (in Arabic), [English: General Principles of Penal Legislation], 
Damascus 1976, at 136.    
16  An official English translation of the French Penal Code is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-
English/Legifrance-translations, last accessed 28 December 2015. 
17  An official English translation of the German Criminal Code is available at http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=752, 
last accessed 28 December 2015. 
18  WATSON GEOFFREY R., Offenders Abroad: the Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, Yale Journal of 
International Law 1992, Vol. 17, 41-84, at 70. 
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principle is confined to a limited number of crimes such as treason, murder and bigamy.19 In 
the United States too, there has been a strong reluctance to exercise the personal principle save 
for crimes of such serious nature as treason.20 Article 113-6 of the French Penal Code implicitly 
excludes the personal principle from governing the cases of petty offences. Nonetheless, the 
French Penal Code has expanded the scope of the personal principle to govern 
misdemeanours. This extensive reading of the personal principle may seem liable to criticism. 
However, the prosecutorial discretion (infra) in France to determine whether to proceed with 
cases concerning the personal principle may compensate for this loose configuration of the 
personal principle. 
2. Double Criminality 
The act for prosecuting for which the personal principle is invoked must have been 
criminalized both in the lex loci delicti (the law of the place of commission of the crime) and in 
the place of its prosecution and trial. Absent this requirement, the personal principle cannot be 
relied upon in that, in such cases, neither the public order of where the crime is committed nor 
that of the perpetrator’s state of origin will be affected. In fact, if we accept that the rationale 
behind exercising the personal principle is to prevent criminals from escaping punishment, it 
would then be absurd to prosecute and try a person for an act not criminalized in the place it is 
committed.21 As a result, the principle of double criminality has found widespread acceptance 
as a precondition for applying the personal principle.22  
The principle of double criminality also figures in the penal codes of many states. For example, 
Article 7 of the Swiss Criminal Code,23 Section 12 of Norway’s General Penal Code24 and 
Section 7 of the German Criminal Code point to the application of the personal principle only 
when the act committed outside their territory is criminalized therein. The French Penal Code 
accepts this precondition only with regard to misdemeanours. Accordingly, when it comes to 
felonies, the French Penal Code applies in an “exclusive and unconditional”25 manner. On the 
first encounter, this formulation of Article 113-6 may seem rather strange in its partial 
deviation from the principle of double criminality. Yet, this provision reveals an important fact, 
that double criminality cannot be considered an absolute principle.26 On some occasions, states 
would rather give priority to their own penal laws, not least because they may consider their 
own formulations as regards the questions of criminalization and penalization better 
positioned to meet the requirements of their own public morals. That said, however, it cannot 
 
19  MALANCZUK, supra n. 13, at 111.   
20  WATSON, supra n. 18, at 40.   
21  FAZEL, supra n. 15, at 138.      
22  MULLAN GRAINNE, The Concept of Double Criminality in the Context of Extra Territorial Crimes, Criminal Law Review 
1997, 17-29.  
23  An unofficial English translation of the Swiss Criminal Code is available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19370083/201501010000/311.0.pdf, last accessed 28 December 2015. 
24  An official English translation of Norway’s Penal Code is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_penal_code.pdf, last accessed 28 December 
2015. 
25  TRIPONEL ANNA, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights Violations 
Abroad, in: MORRIS ANDREW P./ESTREICHER SAMUEL (Eds.), Global Labor and Employment Law for the Practicing Lawyer, 
The Hague 2010, 59-158, at 102. 
26  For a detailed discussion of the French law in this regard, see STEFANI GASTON/LEVASSEUR GEORGES/BOULOC BERNARD, 
Droit pénal général, Paris 2000, at 154.  
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be denied that the French conception of the personal principle is excessively broad, and 
therefore, open to criticism. 
3. The Prohibition of Double Jeopardy (ne bis in idem) 
For the purposes of applying the personal principle, observing the prohibition of double 
jeopardy is of utmost importance. It is fair to say that today the prohibition of double jeopardy 
has become more of a human rights principle than a principle of criminal law. So much so, that 
many human rights instruments have echoed this principle in one way or another.27 For 
example, Article 14(7) of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished 
again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance 
with the law and procedure of each country”.28 Of course, it must be noted that the principle of 
double jeopardy does not prohibit the resumption of a trial or a retrial ordered by a court of 
higher hierarchy.29 
4. The Return of the Accused to his Country of Origin 
Some states such as Iran view the presence of the accused in their territory as a precondition 
for exercising jurisdiction on the basis of the personal principle. This does not hold true for the 
French Penal Code, which permits trials in absentia in cases concerning the personal principle. 
Proceeding with prosecutions and trials without the presence of the accused definitely flies 
against the human rights requirement of fair trial. Notably, the use of trials in absentia is 
mostly allowed in countries that follow the civil law tradition.30 
5. Victim’s Complaint 
Article 113-8 of the French Penal Code stipulates that the prosecution of misdemeanours under 
Article 113-7 can only be initiated “at the behest of the public prosecutor [which] must be 
preceded by a complaint made by the victim, or his successor, or by an official accusation made 
by the authority where the offence was committed”. This precondition can significantly 
prevent an overload of prosecutions. This is notwithstanding the fact that in some penal 
systems such as Iran, most offences are considered public crimes, whose prosecution is not 
necessarily triggered by a private complaint.  
As was seen above, according to Article 113-8, “the behest of the public prosecutor” is a must 
for the prosecution of misdemeanours on the basis of the personal principle. To the extent that 
the authors of this essay have examined the penal codes of other states, it seems that the French 
Penal Code is rather unique in employing the element of prosecutorial discretion as a 
precondition for proceeding with the prosecution of misdemeanours.  
 
27  For a discussion of different dimensions to the prohibition of double jeopardy, see CRYER ROBERT ET AL., An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure, New York 2010, at 80–82. 
28  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Vol. 999, at 171. 
29  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair 
trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007).  
30  Prisoners Abroad (Factsheet), Trials in Absentia (2007) at 9.  
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The prosecutorial discretion in proceeding with the cases of misdemeanours committed abroad 
can preclude the unnecessary cases from being raised in the French penal system, and at the 
same time, this precondition can compensate for the lack of the condition of the presence of the 
accused in the French territory. For in such cases, the prosecutor can decide not to initiate 
prosecution following its discretionary determination that the presence of the accused is 
necessary in order for prosecution to take place. 
IV. Examining the Development of the Personal Principle in 
the Penal System of Iran 
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, Article 3(H) of the 1973 Code had set out five preconditions for 
the application of the personal principle in criminal courts: 1) the personal principle applies to 
offences for which the maximum punishment exceeds one year; 2) the act must be punishable 
under the laws of the country where it is committed; 3) the accused must not have been tried 
and exonerated in the country where he committed his crime, or in the case of his conviction, 
he has not either in part or in total served his sentence; 4) according to the laws of Iran, or the 
country in which the offence has been committed, there must be no cause for waiving the 
prosecution or abolishing the punishment for the accused. To these preconditions must be 
added the presence of the accused within the sovereign borders of Iran mentioned at the 
beginning of Article 3(H). It goes without saying that the content of Article 3(H) signified a 
restrictive formulation for the application of the personal principle, which was extremely 
compatible with the general principles of criminal law, such as the prohibition of double 
jeopardy and double criminality. However, in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
this standard configuration was replaced by a very expansive version of the personal principle. 
Accordingly, Article 7 of the 1991 Code stated that “[i]n addition to the cases mentioned in 
articles 5 and 6, any Iranian who commits a crime outside Iran and is found in Iran shall be 
punished in accordance with the criminal laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. As can be seen, 
of all the preconditions stipulated in the 1973 Code, the only one that found a place in the 1991 
Code was the presence of the accused. This loose formulation of the application of the personal 
principle was criticized by some Iranian scholars.31 The result was that in 2013, the Iranian 
legislature revised the standards governing the personal principle, and imposed other 
prerequisites upon its application. According to Article 7 of the 2013 Code:  
“any Iranian national who commits a crime outside Iran and is found in, or 
extradited to, Iran shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the 
laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided that:  
a)  The committed conduct is deemed an offense under the law of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
 
31  POORBAFRANI HASSAN, Barresi Tatbiqi Onsor Tab'iat Dar Tos'h Qalamrū Makāni Hoqūq Jazā (in Persian) [English: A 
Comparative Study of the Role of Nationality in Expanding the Territorial Scope of Criminal Codes], in: SAFAEI SEYED 
HUSSAIN (Ed.), Tā'molāti Dar Hoqūq Tatbiqi (in Persian) [English: General Thoughts on Comparative Law], Tehran 2007, 345-
360, at 350.  
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b)  If the committed crime is punishable by ta’zir, the accused person is not 
tried and acquitted in the place of the commission of the crime, or in the 
case of conviction the punishment is not, wholly or partly, carried out 
against him. 
c) According to Iranian laws there is no basis for removal or discontinuation of 
prosecution or discontinuation or cancellation of execution of the 
punishment.” 
At first blush, when compared to the 1991 Code, it seems that three other prerequisites have 
been added to that of the presence of the accused in the 2013 Code, namely, the prohibition of 
double jeopardy, double criminality and the existence of a legal basis for initiating a 
prosecution according to Iranian laws. Nevertheless, a closer examination of Article 7 reveals 
that it is only the precondition of double jeopardy that comes to govern the application of the 
personal principle in the criminal jurisprudence of Iran. This calls for an illustration of these 
three preconditions as they appear in the 2013 Code. 
1. The Precondition of Double Criminality 
As a general rule, when penal codes of different states mention the term ‘offence’, they mean 
the particular mode in which it is defined, characterized and criminalized by their own 
national laws. This is because the domestic penal codes mean to protect the functioning values 
of the country in which they operate. The Iranian Penal Codes are no exception in this regard. 
Thus, the concept of ‘crime’ in the clause ‘any Iranian national who commits a crime outside 
Iran’ as manifested at the beginning of Article 7 generally refers to an act recognized as such in 
the context of the Iranian national laws. The problem is that this standard reading of Article 7 
renders redundant the precondition imposed by Article 7(a): “the committed conduct is 
deemed an offense under the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. Obviously, it is neither 
reasonable nor acceptable to prosecute and try a person for an act not deemed an offence 
within the jurisdiction of Iran. Reasonably, the criminal laws of many states support the 
principle of double criminality, which implies that prosecuting an act requires its 
criminalization where it is committed as well as where it stands trial. Therefore, Article 7(a) 
states the obvious, and as such, no weight can be assigned to its content.  
However, one may say that it is possible to interpret Article 7 in a different way, and it can be 
argued that its opening phrase epitomizes the criminality of an act in the place where it is 
committed. If read in this light, Article 7(a) can no longer be considered redundant and 
becomes an implicit articulation of the principle of double criminality. In other words, if an 
Iranian national commits a criminal act in a foreign jurisdiction, the Iranian courts can have 
jurisdiction over trying the accused, provided that his act is deemed to be criminal in Iran. 
However, it seems that this interpretation is also ridden with serious problems. Firstly, if one 
pays attention to Article 8(b) of the 2013 Code, the natural conclusion is that the Iranian law-
makers had not committed Article 7(a) to hint at the principle of double criminality. According 
to Article 8(b), “[i]n the case of crimes punishable by ta’zir, the committed conduct is deemed 
an offense under the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the law of the place of the 
commission”. 
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The Assembly of Guardians, whose task is to monitor the compatibility of the parliamentary 
enactments with sharia law and to provide interpretative guidelines for the state’s laws, has 
discerned that the general application of Article 8(b) contradicts the Islamic prescriptions on 
punishments,32 although it has not identified such contradiction for Article 7(a). Secondly, it 
would be generally very bizarre if one were to interpret the phrase ‘the committed conduct’ in 
Article 7(a) to mean an act criminalized in the penal laws of foreign states. As mentioned 
above, this is not an acceptable form of authoring or interpreting penal codes.   
In any case, it seems that selecting each of the interpretations discussed above can create 
unresolvable problems. If choosing the first interpretation, one cannot fail to arrive at the 
conclusion that Article 7(a) is redundant in its entirety. At the same time, the second 
interpretation signifies a deviation from the standard way in which the penal codes of different 
states are authored. Yet, it must be noted that the second interpretation accommodates the 
standards of international criminal law in a better fashion. Therefore, it seems necessary to 
amend Article 7(a), and rewrite it in a way that resembles Article 8(b), and this will be 
discussed below. 
2. The Principle of Double Jeopardy 
The inclusion of double jeopardy is the only uncontroversial development built into the 2013 
Code as regards the personal principle.33 Double jeopardy has become an important safeguard 
for protecting the rights of individuals in the field of international human rights.34 According to 
this principle, respecting fairness and justice requires that an accused be held judicially 
responsible for an illegal action only once. Article 7(b) posits that “[i]f the committed crime is 
punishable by ta’zir, the accused person is not tried and acquitted in the place of the 
commission of the crime, or in the case of conviction the punishment is not, wholly or partly, 
carried out against him”. As a result, if an Iranian national commits a crime outside Iran, and is 
subjected to trial and punishment there, he cannot be tried and punished in Iran again. 
However, if he has not served punishment either in part or in total, it is possible to bring him 
before an Iranian court on another occasion. Obviously, in a scenario where the sentence of a 
convict is only partly carried out, it will not be the Iranian judiciary’s responsibility to carry out 
the unexecuted part of the sentence. Rather, in these cases, the Iranian judiciary must establish 
a new trial for the accused to be tried in accordance with Iranian criminal laws. This is because, 
save for some exceptional cases such as the international agreements on the transfer of persons 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment in foreign countries, states do not execute the sentences of 
those convicted in foreign jurisdictions.35 However, an Iranian judge can reduce the 
punishment of those who have served part of their sentence abroad by invoking the 
diminutive factors of punishment articulated in Article 22 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013.  
 
32  The interpretive guidelines of the Assembly of Guardians is available at http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/Home/, last 
accessed 28 December 2015. 
33  RAHMDEL MANSOUR, The "ne bis in idem" rule in Iranian Criminal Law, Journal of Financial Crimes 2004, Vol. 11, 277-281, 
at 277.  
34  KIRBY MICHAEL, Carroll, Double Jeopardy and International Human Rights Law, Criminal Law Journal 2003, Vol. 27, 231-
276, at 269.  
35  CRYER, supra n. 27, at 105.  
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However, the principle of double jeopardy in the Iranian courts is respected only insofar as its 
application relates to ta’zirat, whose specific cases and punishments are not prescribed in 
sharia law. Hence, when at issue are offences of the kind susceptible to such types of 
punishments as hodood, qisas and diyat, and ta’zirat prescribed by sharia law, Article 7(2) 
cannot generally be applied. This means, for example, if an Iranian national accused of murder 
is tried and punished in England, he can be subjected to another trial and punishment in Iran 
for the same crime upon his return to Iran, since his crime is punishable by qisas. Needless to 
say, this cannot be deemed acceptable either from the vantage point of penal law standards or 
those of international human rights law. However, this unacceptable delimitation of the 
prohibition of double jeopardy signifies a more serious problem within the genus of criminal 
laws in Iran. That is to say, in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a constant 
preoccupation of the legislature in Iran has been to strike a balance between the modern 
standards of penal law codification and the imperatives of Islamic criminal law. Yet on many 
occasions, this balance has easily been lost, and as a result, shallow rules have emerged.36 The 
blame cannot here be solely put on the Iranian legislature, because the Parliament is compelled 
to pass laws that meet the Islamic standards as identified by the Guardian Council. More often 
than not, the Guardian Council applies a strict scrutiny test to the parliamentary drafts, and in 
the case of detecting an area of incompatibility, returns the said drafts to the Parliament for 
reconsideration. The Guardian Council exercised a controversially harsh standard of review to 
the 2013 Code.37 
3. The Existence of a Legal Basis for Prosecution 
As was mentioned above, Article 7(c) stated that “[a]ccording to Iranian laws there is no basis 
for removal or discontinuation of prosecution or discontinuation or cancellation of execution of 
the punishment”. Much in the same way as Article 7(a), this section also states the obvious, and 
its inclusion in the 2013 Code seems to have served no purpose. Obviously, the criminal courts 
in Iran are bound to follow the Iranian penal laws, and there is no need to emphasize this 
simple fact of prosecution and criminal adjudication any further. Interestingly, unlike 
Article 7(a), it is impossible to devise a reading of Article 7(c) that would give meaning and 
utility to its content.  
This unusual way of legislating the issue of personal jurisdiction is very telling in that it shows 
that the question of prerequisites for the application of personal jurisdiction in Iran has long 
been neglected, and now that the Iranian law-makers have come to address this issue, they 
have created conceptual chaos in formulating the contours of the personal principle. 
Furthermore, the 2013 Code has clearly not established sufficient preconditions for the 
application of the personal principle. For example, the Code in question has not made any 
distinction between different types of offences for the purposes of applying the personal 
 
36  In the larger context of the Iranian criminal justice system, some Iranian scholars have argued that reaching a balanced 
position with regard to both sharia law and modern standards of criminal justice is an impossible project, since these two 
regimes are incompatible in nature. In this regard, SANEI writes: “we have a constructed image of sharia law, and have not 
but entrapped ourselves within the walls of this image, which we have mistaken for the sharia proper”, SANE'I P., Hoqūq 
Jazāye Omūmi (in Persian) [English: General Criminal Law], Tehran 2003, at 22.   
37  TAVANA MOHAMMAD H., Three Decades of Islamic Criminal Law Legislation in Iran: Legislative History Analysis with 
Emphasis on the Amendments of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 2014, 
Vol. 2, 24-38, at 29.  
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principle. The principle of double criminality is totally neglected, and the prohibition of double 
jeopardy has only been partly accepted. Unfortunately, the authors of the 2013 Code did not 
avail themselves to other states’ experience of criminal legislation, and chose not to include the 
two preconditions of victim’s complaint and the behest of the public prosecutor as they appear 
in the French Penal Code. Importantly, these two preconditions do not seem to have been at 
odds with the dictates of sharia law. 
V. The Passive Personality Principle: Definition and 
Limitations 
The application of the passive personality principle also results in an extension of the 
legislative and jurisdiction of states vis-à-vis crimes committed outside their sovereign 
territory. The judicial invocation of this principle has not been devoid of criticism.38 However, 
notwithstanding these criticisms, the passive personality principle has secured a place in the 
criminal laws of many states such as France, Germany, Brazil, Greece, Turkey and Mexico.39 
Notably, most of the preconditions and limitations governing the exercise of the personal 
principle also usually come to regulate the application of the passive personality principle. 
As was said above, the application of the passive personality principle cannot be done in an 
unfettered manner. For example, Section 5 of the Criminal Code of Finland has limited the 
application of the passive personality principle to offences “punishable by imprisonment for 
more than six months”.40 Section 7 of the German Criminal Code puts an emphasis on the 
prerequisite of the double criminality for applying the passive personality principle, and the 
French Penal Code has excluded petty offences from the application of the passive personality 
principle, and confines the exercise of this jurisdictional base to felonies and misdemeanours 
punishable by imprisonment. Apart from the exclusion of petty offences, Articles 113-8 and 
113-9 have added other preconditions for the exercise of the passive personality principle in 
France. Article 113-8 holds that 
“[i]n the cases set out under articles 113-6 and 113-7, the prosecution of 
misdemeanors may only be instigated at the behest of the public prosecutor. It 
must be preceded by a complaint made by the victim or his successor, or by an 
official accusation made by the authority of the country where the offence was 
committed.” 
As was remarked earlier in this essay, this procedural precondition bestows a prosecutorial 
discretion upon the public prosecutor by which to block the entry of unnecessary and 
insignificant cases into the French criminal justice system on the basis of either the personal or 
the passive personality principle.  
 
38  The Lotus Case (1927), PCIJ, Ser A, No.10.  
39  SØRENSEN MAX, Manual of Public International Law, New York 1968, at 368.  
40  An unofficial English translation of the Penal Code of Finland is available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5614.html, last accessed 28 December 2015. 
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Also, Article 113-9 refers to the principle of double jeopardy and prohibits the prosecution and 
punishment of those already tried and sentenced in foreign jurisdictions, and finally, in a 
similar manner to the practice of personal jurisdiction, the French Penal Code has not viewed 
the presence of an accused person in the French territory as a must for exercising the passive 
personality principle. However, as was discussed earlier, this deficiency can be compensated 
by the prosecutorial discretion in initiating a prosecution. Notwithstanding the prosecutorial 
discretion, the French conception of the passive personality principle has been criticized for 
providing “jurisdiction to the broadest extent possible under the passive personality 
principle”.41 Of course, this criticism seems justified when one considers that the requirement 
of double criminality is also absent in Article 113-9. In the United States, one sees a much 
narrower construction of the passive personality principle. Before the 1970s, the passive 
personality principle had been granted no place in the criminal laws of the United States.42 
However, subsequent to joining treaties on terrorism, some new laws were enacted to 
incorporate the passive personality principle into the criminal jurisprudence of the United 
States.43 Undoubtedly, the formulation of the passive personality principle in the United States 
signifies the narrow end of the spectrum when compared to the manner conceived in the 
French Penal Code. 
1. The Passive Personality Principle in the 2013 Code 
The 2013 Code must be considered the first textual base in the context of the Iranian criminal 
laws to give effect to the passive personality principle. According to Article 8 of this code:  
“When a non-Iranian person outside Iran commits a crime other than those 
mentioned in previous articles against an Iranian person or the Iranian State 
and is found in, or extradited to, Iran, his crime shall be dealt with in 
accordance with the criminal laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided 
that: 
a) in the case of crimes punishable by ta’zir, the accused person is not tried 
and acquitted in the place of commission of the crime, or in the case of 
conviction, the punishment is not, wholly or partly, carried out against 
him; 
b) in the case of crimes punishable by ta’zir, the committed conduct is 
deemed an offence under the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
law of the place of the commission.” 
The following will scrutinize the strengths and flaws of the conception of the passive 
personality in the Islamic Penal Code of 2013.  
 
41  MCCARTHY JOHN G., The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combating Terrorism, Fordham International Law 
Journal 1989, Vol. 13, 298-327, at 314.  
42  LOWENFELD ANDREAS F., U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law 1989, Vol. 83, 880-893, at 887.  
43  WATSON GEOFFREY R., The Passive Personality Principle, Texas International Law Journal 1993, Vol. 28, 1-46, at 3.   
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Unlike the chaotic formulation of the personality principle, the passive personality principle in 
Article 8 of the 2013 Code takes a more coherent shape. As a result, the limitations reserved for 
the application of the passive personality principle make a much clearer appearance in 
Article 8. As is clear from the text of Article 8, these limitations are: 1) the prohibition of trials 
in absentia; 2) the prohibition of double jeopardy; and 3) the requirement of double criminality. 
Especially with regard to the requirement of double criminality in Article 8, the drafters of the 
2013 Code have employed a precise language pre-empting any misunderstanding of this 
requirement, which, as was examined above, is missing in Article 7(a). 
Another strength of Article 8 lies in its use of the opening phrase “a non-Iranian person”. Two 
important points immediately come to mind as regards this choice of language. Firstly, the 
invocation of the term ‘person’ instead of ‘individual’ reveals that other types of legal entities 
(such as corporations) can also be deemed to be responsible for committing offences, thereby 
being brought before a trial on the basis of the passive personality principle. The second point 
is that the reach of the passive personality principle cannot be stretched to include Iranian 
offenders committing offences outside the Iranian borders, as this must come under the ambit 
of the personality principle. Excluding the Iranian nationals from the scope of Article 8 must be 
commended, since if an Iranian national falls victim to the crimes of another Iranian outside 
the sovereign borders of Iran, the personal principle can better protect the rights of the Iranian 
victim, not least because there are fewer constraints put on the exercise of the personal 
principle. Of course, this is not a general formula, and based on their particular conception of 
jurisdictional bases, states can choose to apply the passive personality principle when both the 
offender and the victim hold their nationality. 
Of particular relevance in this regard is the way the French Penal Code has conceived the 
passive personality principle. According to the French Penal Code, the passive personality 
principle applies to the cases where both victims and offenders in extra-territorial scenarios are 
French. However, it has rightly been argued that the French Penal Code takes too generous an 
approach towards the passive personality principle.44 Also, Article 8 employs the term “an 
Iranian person” to describe the victims of crimes committed abroad subject to the passive 
personality principle, which moves one to conclude that the application of this jurisdictional 
base is not confined to natural persons. Rather, the application of the passive personality 
principle must cover other legal entities as well. This is a more precise description of the 
victims of crimes committed abroad in comparison to the penal codes of other states. For 
example, Article 7(1) of the German Penal Code states that “German criminal law shall apply 
to offences committed abroad against a German, if the act is a criminal offence at the locality of 
its commission or if that locality is not subject to any criminal jurisdiction”. Here, one can 
rightly ask if the term ‘a German’ encompasses legal entities as well as natural persons. 
A similar issue has come to the surface with regard to Article 7 of the Swiss Criminal Code, 
where the application of the passive personality principle is conditioned upon the victims 
being ‘Swiss’. In both Switzerland and Germany, a lengthy debate has ensued over whether 
corporate entities must be considered as being within the meaning of ‘German’ or ‘Swiss’ for 
 
44  For a more detailed analysis of the French law in this regard, see CAFRITZ ERIC/TENE OMER, Article 113-7 of the French 
Penal Code: The Passive Personality Principle, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 2003, Vol. 41, 285-599, at 587–588.  
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the purposes of exercising the passive personality principle.45 This is while the drafters of the 
2013 Code have avoided the hassle of this question by coining a clear terminology. 
2. Flaws of Article 8 
On close scrutiny, one can also detect some flaws in the text of Article 8, for example, where it 
speaks of committing a crime “against the Iranian state”, since one wonders to what end this 
phrase has found an expression in Article 8. The unfortunate appearance of this phrase is both 
redundant and harmful, since if it means to allude to the protective principle, Article 5 of the 
code in question had already done that job, and there was no need to repeat this principle in a 
place dedicated to another jurisdictional base. This misplacement of the phrase “against the 
Iranian state” is also harmful, because it may confuse one as to the application of the protective 
principle. The exercise of the protective principle is not normally governed by as many 
constraints as the personal and the passive personality principles. Indeed, states prefer to save 
a free reign for themselves when it comes to prosecuting crimes giving rise to the protective 
principle. This is due to the fact that the protective principle targets crimes endangering the 
vital interests of states, which in turn, moves these entities to make no compromise on the 
exercise of this principle.46 As a result, the sudden use of the phrase “against the Iranian state” 
may mislead one to conclude that the exercise of the protective principle is limited by the same 
preconditions as those governing the passive personality principle.  
Another weakness of Article 8 is its peculiar invocation of the prohibition of double jeopardy. 
While stating the prohibition of double jeopardy, Article 8(a) puts the condition of the accused 
not having been tried and acquitted in the place of commission of the crime. Here, one may 
legitimately ask: what if an accused is tried and acquitted in a forum other than the place of 
commission of the crime? Of course, the scope of the prohibition of double jeopardy cannot be 
considered as limited such as to only govern situations where an accused is tried in the place 
where his alleged crimes are committed. Suppose a French citizen commits a crime against an 
Iranian national in France and he is tried for that same crime in Lebanon, and serves his 
punishment wholly or partly therein. Given this, would it be reasonable for an Iranian court to 
proceed with his trial and conviction by invoking Article 8(a) and on the basis that he is not 
tried, convicted or acquitted in France. This would vigorously slap common sense, and fly 
against any known principle of fairness and justice in the sphere of penal law. Yet, an 
overzealous textual reading of Article 8(a) leaves the door open for prosecuting those already 
convicted or acquitted in the judicial forums of countries other than the place of commission of 
crimes.  
Another defect of the conception of the passive personality principle in Article 8 lies in 
reserving such limitations as the prohibition of double jeopardy and the principle of double 
criminality only “for crimes punishable by ta’zir”. Therefore, these preconditions cannot 
regulate the exercise of the passive personality principle for crimes punishable by hodood, 
qisas and diyat. Of course, this unfortunate jurisdictional expansion has far-reaching 
implications, being not only confined to the passive personality principle in Iran, but also 
 
45  ECHLE REGULA, The Passive Personality Principle and the General Principle of Ne Bis In Idem, Utrecht Law Review 2013, 
Vol. 9, 56-67, at 61.    
46  CASSESE ANTONIO (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford 2009, at 274.   
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governing the application of the personal principle as well. From the perspective of the general 
principles of penal law, such an approach is utterly unacceptable, and violates the most 
elementary principles of fair trial as recognized in the domains of penal law and international 
human rights law. What is more, the drafters of the 2013 Code have excluded ta’zir offences 
prescribed by sharia law from the limitations set out in Article 8. As was explained above, such 
deviations from the international standards of criminal justice take their cue from law-makers’ 
failure to strike a balance between the modern imperatives of criminal justice and those of 
sharia law. 
VI. Conclusion 
It is not uncommon for states (especially those belonging to the civil law tradition) to resort to 
the personal and the passive personality principles to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over 
crimes committed outside their sovereign borders. However, an unhinged practice of these two 
jurisdictional bases can clash with the principle of sovereignty, and at the same time, 
undermine the highly respected maxims of criminal law. Therefore, any nationality-based 
claim to jurisdiction must be predicated upon meeting some pre-determined requirements. For 
better or worse, due to the diverse approach of states to these requirements, it is not always 
easy to stipulate a uniform list for them. Yet, such prohibitive principles such as double 
criminality and double jeopardy can be taken as a minimum yardstick for constraining the 
exercise of the personal and the passive personality principles. Against this background, the 
Iranian encounter with the personal and the passive personality principles as manifested in the 
2013 Code is neither a success nor a complete failure. It is not a failure because compared to its 
predecessors, the 2013 Code at least on the surface acknowledges the existence of some 
preconditions governing the personal principle, and for the first time in the aftermath of the 
1979 Revolution, purports to regulate the passive personality principle. Nonetheless, the 
formulation these two jurisdictional bases are configured in the 2013 Code is punctuated by 
some conspicuous fallacies.  
It was seen above that as regards to the personal principle, Article 7 had been formulated in so 
strange a form as to render all preconditions other than the prohibition of double jeopardy 
totally meaningless. This is while the appearance of Article 7 moves one to think that the 
Iranian law-makers had actually intended to set out some other preconditions for the exercise 
of the personal principle. However, the chaotic conceptual architecture of Article 7 fails to 
drive its intended result home. 
Furthermore, the preconditions governing the personal and the passive personality principles 
are entirely lifted when it comes to the crimes punishable by hodood, qisas and diyat. It is true 
that when compared to the crimes punishable by ta’zirat, these categories of crimes signify a 
much smaller group. Still, it is not acceptable for the 2013 Code to ignore some of the most 
primary rules of criminal justice, such as the precondition of double jeopardy. As was argued 
above, extra-territorial jurisdiction represents an area in which the legislature is yet to render 
compatible the dictates of sharia law with the modern standards of criminal justice. 
